

"SOUL" AND "SELF": SOVIET AND AMERICAN CULTURES IN CONVERSATION

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The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well belong to the individual, but the particular set of rules which transforms him into a human being derives from requirements established in the ritual organization of social encounters.

Erving Goffman, 1967, 45.

CONVERSATION, from one view, is everywhere a culturally situated accomplishment, shaped as it is by local codes, local expressions of what persons and social relations are (and should be), what persons can (and should) do and what, if anything, can (and should) be felt. But nowhere do participants invoke the same codes, the same currents of culture, on all conversational occasions. Nor anywhere do these necessarily situate all participants in the same way. This latter dynamic—of cross-currents in talk—is especially pronounced on intercultural and multicultural occasions when various communication codes—various beliefs about persons, actions, and feelings—become deeply perplexing one to the other.¹

This essay explores one such conversational occasion, an intercultural encounter, in which two different cultural currents are flowing, one Soviet, the other American.² The general theoretical attitude informing the study of this occasion is elaborated elsewhere.³ The analytical problem is one of hearing cultural systems in conversation, the general response being one of treating seriously native terms, the dimensions and domains of meaning they invoke, cultural forms of expression, indigenous conversational rules (or structuring norms), and the meanings about persons, actions, and feelings implicated in these. These concepts, together, provide a general lens with which to view (or hear) culturally communicated meaning systems, with each separately bringing into focus a more specific theoretical concern with regard to conversed moments. Through the application of the general framework, distinctive cultural currents in conversation are discovered, with each being a local theory for conducting and interpreting communicative action. The case thus demonstrates the workings of a general theoretical attitude, the fruits of which unveil culturally situated, communication systems.

The title of the essay invites reflection upon the concept of culture while suggesting that whatever culture is, indeed for the title to make full sense, it is something which is implicated, employed, or creatively invoked in conversation. Treated this way, conversation is at times a cultural accomplishment and, in turn, culture at such times animates, lives in, or provides tangible resources for conversation. From this view, then, culture is not a physical place, a social group of people, nor a whole way of living, although it does create, when used, mutually intelligible senses of place, persons, and patterns of living. What culture is, from this view, is a system of expressive practices fraught with feeling, a system of symbols, premises, rules, forms, and the domains and dimensions of mutual meanings associated with these. When culture is creatively invoked in conversation, it alerts interlocutors to their

common life, its particularities of place, people, and patterns of life, whether tense or harmonious.

Ethnographic studies of speaking—the kind being done here—have examined the cultural patterning of communicative activity within specific social situations and communities, drawing attention to phenomena such as the cultural communication of gender, place, and events, the deep cultural meaning systems expressed through communicative forms such as the call/response form, and the narrating of cultural symbolism.⁴ Some field-based analyses have compared cultural styles of speaking.⁵ All of these studies, however, have focused primarily on monologic texts, specific cultural patterns, or, when exploring intercultural dynamics, have relied on data elicited within interview formats, or reports about intercultural contacts, rather than focusing upon actual, situated intercultural encounters. As some investigators have pointed out, no ethnographic work has yet been done which involves a cultural interpretation of face-to-face, intercultural interaction.⁶ The present study is warranted, then, because it explores (a) a conversational segment, (b) in which different cultural systems come into contact, which yields (c) initial interpretations of some Soviet public speech, with further attention to American speech patterns, and reveals (d) some deep sources of perplexity of each toward the other.

The primary exemplar, or spoken instance, in this essay is a segment of talk produced during the popular American television program, *Donahue*.⁷ This particular segment appeared as part of a week-long series titled, *Donahue in Russia*, taped in Moscow and broadcast in the United States during the week of February 9, 1987. It consists of the first three minutes and forty seconds of the second program in the series.⁸ Other than a brief "talk-over" by Phil Donahue (16.8 sec.), the segment—following Donahue's normal production format—underwent no post-production editing. This particular segment is a rather fortunate one for the kind of analysis being done here, and was chosen for two general reasons. First, it involves a general interactional process which Goffman called "ritual interchange." Goffman's ritual framework is ideally suited for drawing attention to some episodes of intercultural interaction, for it is expressly designed to deal with processes of "disequilibrium," as when one senses something has "gone wrong" and tries to get the interaction going more smoothly.⁹ The segment was also chosen because in it two cultural systems are being used to guide communication conduct, its production, interpretation, and evaluation. Because the segment instantiates a generic form of ritualized face-work, it is ideally suited for interactional analysis. Because it involves different cultures being creatively employed to guide, evaluate, and justify actions, it is ideally suited for ethnographic study. Eventually, if the following analysis attains some degree of success, that is, if the analysis unveils cultural features of two systems of speaking, readers should be better positioned to hear and see how cultures shape this conversation and better positioned to understand why, as one Soviet viewer (bilingual in Russian and English) of the segment put it, "They think they're talking about the same thing, but they're not." What, in this speech, leads this interlocutor to this conclusion? How could she hear in this intercultural encounter (as did other viewers who are members of both communities) not just one, but two very different systems operating? How does one hear in this, and other conversations, culture(s) at work?

TRANSCRIPT

- 1a) DONAHUE: Would you kindly stand for one second, please?
 2a) You had sex, when you were 18 years old?
 3a) SOVIET MALE A (trans.): Yes, that's when I started.
 b) (.....)
 c) (.....)
 4a) D: Did you use contraceptive when you practiced sex at age 18?
 [Audience laughter]
 5a) SMA (trans.): Yes.
 b) Yes.
 c) Да.
 6a) D: Did you take care of this matter yourself or did the girl insist that
 7a) you do it?
 8a) SMA (trans.): Yeah, I knew about it before.
 b) Well (.) I knew it before that (.)
 c) Ну я до этого знал
 9a) Before that I knew quite a bit.
 b) I knew a lot before that (.)
 c) Я до того знал уже многое
 [PAN TO AUDIENCE LAUGHTER, SMILES]
 10a) I knew how, when, what, etc. I was well prepared.
 b) Well before I knew how, what, why (.) I was well prepared.
 c) Ну до этого знал и как, что, чего... Был хорошо подготовлен.
 11a) D: Are most Soviet boys conscientious, like you, in protecting the
 12a) girl from pregnancy?
 13a) SMA (trans.): Basically, yes. Why don't you ask the others?
 b) Yes (.) basically, yes (.) But actually ask the people themselves.
 c) Да, в основном да. А вообще-то спросите у ребят самих
 [PAN TO AUDIENCE SMILES]
 14a) D: Yes?
 15a) Sov. Female A (trans.): You talk as though everybody here was
 b) # You talk as if everyone present here is
 c) Вы так говорите как будто бы вот каждый из присутствующих
 16a) already involved in that . I think when most of my girlfriends had
 b) doing it. I don't know about that, most of my girlfriends
 c) этим занимается. Я не знаю , большинство моих подруг
 17a) gotten married at 18 or 20, they were virgins,
 b) got married when they were 18 and 20, and they all were virgins. # (.)
 c) вышли замуж в 18 и 20 они были девушками.
 18a) and before marriage they did not engage in sex.
 b) # Before marriage did not even plan on having sex or sexual life.

- c) **До брака и вообще не собирались заниматься сексом и сексуальной жизнью.**
- 19a) They were waiting for that one special man, for that one special
 b) They were waiting for their one # (.) and only (.)
 c) Они ждали своего одного единственного
- 20a) person, and they found that one special person.
 b) #marriage with one person # (.) and they found it.
 c) **брака с одним человеком, и они его нашли.**
- 21a) And most of their husbands also, for most of them their wife
 b) And for the majority of their husbands (.)
 c) **И для большинства их мужей**
- 22a) also was the first woman with whom they had ever had sexual relations.
 b) as well (.) for them their wife was their first girl. (.)
 c) **тоже для них их жена была первая девушка.**
- 23a)
 b) Woman that they liked.
 c) **Женщина которая понравилась.**
- 24a) D: Is it true with most girls, most young women are virgins when
 25a) they get married in the Soviet Union?
- 26a) SFA (trans.): Well, a great number of girls are virgins until marriage.
 b) Well, (.) in general, (.) the larger part of girls are virgins before marriage. They just start leading that type of life after marriage.
 c) **Ну, ну в общем большая часть девушек является девушками до замужества. Они начинают только жить такой жизнью только после замужества.**
- 27a) I don't really know, maybe not everybody.
 b) Well, I don't know, maybe not (*all/quite*).
 c) **Ну я не знаю может быть не (*все/совсем*)**
- 28a) Sov. Female B (trans.): You know, I just want to say
 b) #I want to say
 c) **Я хочу сказать,**
- 29a) that I think it's quite the opposite. You can't really say that it's
 b) on the contrary# well in my opinion if not to say that it is
 c) **что наоборот, ну по-моему если не**
- 30a) very good if a girl when she gets married is still a virgin, because
 b) negative (.) you definitely cannot say that it is very good, if the girl when getting married is still a virgin (.)
 c) **отрицательное, то нельзя сказать что это очень хорошо если девушка выходя замуж еще девушка.**
- 31a) I think quite the opposite. She should be quite sure
 b) #Because I think that by that time, she basically should be sure
 c) **Потому что я считаю, тогда она вобщем-то уже должна быть уверена**
- 32a) of what her husband is as a man, that he'll be a real partner
 b) of her husband as a man # (.)
 c) **в своем муже как мужчине**

- 33a) for her, otherwise it could be a real tragedy.
 b) because otherwise it could be a tragedy. #(.....) #
 c) а иначе же может быть трагедия а иначе может быть трагедия (.....)

- 34a) And sex for a married couple is extremely important.
 b) It is very important # (.....) #
 c) Это очень важно(.....)

- 35a) After all, sex is 80% of happiness for a married couple
 b) Practically (.) makes up, #well, 80% of happiness.
 c) Практически, ну 80 % счастья занимает.

- 36a) but, of course, that depends on each individual woman.
 b) Of course it depends on every individual woman #
 c) Естественно это зависит от каждой женщины

- 37a) But for me I think that's very important.
 b) (.....)
 c) (.....)

38a) Sov. Female C : I think it is necessary to change the subject

39a) of conversation, because these questions are very deep

40a) to be concerned by us.

[AUDIENCE APPLAUSE]

- 41a) D (speaking over tape): This is day two of our visit to the Soviet
 42a) Union. In this hour Soviet teens give a powerful exchange on
 43a) everything from religion to war. But unlike American teenagers,
 44a) areas they were reluctant to discuss included dating,
 45a) school and sexuality.

46a) Sov. Male B (trans.) (in response to an inaudible question by Donahue): It's not a surprise that American students can't

- b) (.....)
 c) (.....)

- 47a) understand us, because they have many more problems
 b) Much more serious problems than (.) ours because (.....)
 c) На много серьезнее проблемы чем у нас потому что (.....)

- 48a) than we have, the criminality, drugs, etc. Secondly,
 b) (.....) Secondly (.)
 c) (.....) во вторых

- 49a) all boys and girls here are in somewhat different surroundings.
 b) all the young people here (.) found themselves (.) well, in (.....)
 c) все ребята сидящие здесь попали ну в (.....)

- 50a) This is new to them. They've never been on television
 b) (.....) situation. (.....)
 c) (.....) ситуации (.....)

51a) and this is the reason why they can't immediately talk to you

- b) (.....)
c) (.....)
- 52a) as they do in America, where they are probably more easy going,
b) We are not used to (*hanging out*) more uptight (.....) not
c) **Мы не привыкли (шататься) скованней (.....) не вероятно,**
- 53a) and when they may even have experience of being on television.
b) that they (*have ever been on television*).
c) **что они (когда-нибудь были на телевиденье)**
- 54a) Sov. Male C (trans.): What can we do if everything is all right here?
b) Well, what can we do if everything is all right? (.)
c) Ну что мы можем сделать если все в порядке?
- 55a) Should we create problems?
b) Should we think up a problem?
c) **Что, проблему придумать?**
- 56a) Sov. Male D (trans.): We don't want to invent problems. Why?
b) We don't want to invent ourselves the problems. Why?
c) **Мы не хотим придумывать себе проблем. Зачем?**
- [LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE]
- 57a) Sov. Male E: School is likewise, sometimes you are happy
58a) and sometimes you express just no particular emotions,
59a) and that's all.
- 60a) D: All right, I will listen to your advice and I will change the
61a) subject.

RITUALS AND CULTURAL DISCOURSES

Some conversational episodes foreground a particular interactional goal: the remedy of improprieties. More than anyone, Goffman has drawn our attention to the ritualized form of this type of corrective process:

When the participants in an undertaking or encounter fail to prevent the occurrence of an event that is expressively incompatible with the judgments of social worth that are being maintained, and when the event is of the kind that is difficult to overlook, then the participants are likely to give it accredited status as an incident—to ratify it as a threat that deserves direct official attention—and to proceed to try to correct for its effects. At this point one or more participants find themselves in an established state of ritual disequilibrium or disgrace, and an attempt must be made to re-establish a satisfactory ritual state for them.¹⁰

Typically, claims Goffman, such corrective processes follow a rather loosely bound generic sequence, such that an exigence is created, through the vehicle of an impropriety, which is socially identified, further publicized, followed by an offering of corrections by the violator(s), which is subsequently accepted (or not), leading to the re-establishment of what he calls "the expressive order" (or its continuing negotiation, or disruption).¹¹

Let us look briefly at the ritual Donahue invokes in his speech, then at the Soviet one which engulfs him.¹² It is no surprise that Donahue, in his opening segment,

initiates discussion with a version of the ritual form which is familiar to him and his American audience. In his first utterances on lines 1–2, 4, 6–7, 11–12, 24–25, Donahue inquires about sex, contraceptive use, pregnancy, and virginity. Topics such as these, Donahue presumes, provide an exigence for public discourse, just as similar topics do in his homeland, erected on the communal assumption, in Bitzer's terms,¹³ that there is an "imperfection marked by urgency." In this case, presumably, the imperfection consists of unwanted pregnancies and perhaps irresponsible premarital sex.¹⁴ The scene is a rhetorical one in that Donahue presumes it can be positively modified, with a partial remedy possibly created through the means of public discourse. Donahue presumes his interlocutors can be influenced by such discourse and thus can subsequently become "mediators of change,"¹⁵ equipped (or informed?) better to redress these presumed imperfections. Donahue, then, attempts to co-create with his interlocutors a kind of ritualized and rhetorical action, to display what he considers to be "a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it."¹⁶ The exigence (e.g., the unwanted pregnancies), the means of responding (e.g., public discourse, confessions, truth-sayings), and its meanings (e.g., the remedy of a societal impropriety through public participation) cohere, from this view, as a common and productive way to address social problems through open, public discussion, that is, the American communication ritual. Donahue's interrogative utterances, as such, are not just questions or directives; they are moves in a culturally expressive—albeit ritually performed—game.¹⁷

The ritualized speech that Donahue presumes and initiates, however, from the standpoint of the Soviet expressive order, is inappropriate, even incoherent. Immediately at lines 2–4 Donahue's interlocutor is taken aback (i.e., literally steps back from Donahue) while others laugh out loud, smile broadly, and whisper in each other's ears. The exigence Donahue invites his audience to address (e.g., the unwanted pregnancies) becomes immediately supplanted by another of their own (i.e., the foreign talk show host's interactional comportment). This imperfection grows with mounting urgency until finally, on lines 38–40, a woman speaks in English, the first to do so, telling Donahue, to the delighted applause of her "contemporaries,"¹⁸ that "it is necessary to change the subject," which Donahue eventually on lines 60–61 agrees to do.

An American Voice

Note the question by Donahue on line 2: "You had sex when you were 18 years old?" He probes the issue by asking further about "contraceptive use" (4) and who took "care of this matter" (6), "protecting the girl from pregnancy" (11–12). What must be presumed for these comments indeed to be intelligible? What exotic American tree is planted here, but later uprooted from Soviet soil?

Donahue's speech characterizes a kind of human activity, presumably coitus, as "had sex" and "practiced sex"; refers to it as an activity which is "practiced," then associates this "practice" with a technique, the "use [of] a contraceptive"; probes which individual was responsible for its "use"; and mentions a biological motive for contraception ("protection from pregnancy"). Human procreative activity is communicated here, then, as "sex," as an experience one "has" or "practices" in a particular way, which involves as part of the practice the possibility of contraceptive use, with this use being a primary responsibility of one of the involved individuals, because

"protection" from biological consequences is desirable or necessary. The symbolic structuring of the topic invoked by Donahue thus draws attention—and directs subsequent discussion—to at least three prominent cultural domains: physical facts (who did this activity, at what age, with what biological consequences), technical utilities (what techniques or technologies were used), and individual actions (did *you* do it, who is responsible). The tone used for the discussion could be characterized as a "serious rationality" which foregrounds not the passionate bonds among persons, nor their moral status, but "sex" as a factual, technical, "practice" among individuals.¹⁹

Note further the sequence of symbols used, from "sex" (2, 4) to protection from "pregnancy" (11–12). The symbolic sequence takes "sex" in the direction of a problem of unwanted pregnancy and brings closer to the interactional surface other projectable problems that are culturally associated with this, problems such as premarital sex, irresponsible sexual practices, single parent families, abortion, venereal diseases, AIDS, issues of morality, welfare systems, the population explosion, and so on. To an American ear, exposed to such a system, all of this could come to pass rather naturally. One can hear, without too much strain or reflection, even if angered by this line of questioning, the kind of thing Donahue is "getting at."

Such a line of questioning demonstrates a kind of "problem talk," or self-help dialogue, which functions—in part—to foreground various imperfections and thus to motivate subsequent utterances. The communicative form, a round-the-rally of problems-responses, involves a three part spiralling sequence which introduces a topic, renders it problematic, precipitating responses which redress or further elaborate the problems.²⁰ Note how the form takes a topic in the direction of problems, thus creating an exigence for various additional responses. The form—when animating American public discourse—creates outcomes in two directions: concerning the topics of discussion, it problematizes them, directing interlocutors along a plaintive conversation of flaws; concerning the form of public discussion, it motivates a spiralling of utterances which legitimates lengthy public discussion of the topic at hand. The form underlies much American public "discussion," from talk shows to self-help groups to faculty meetings, leading those familiar with it to identify in it a kind of integrative communal action in which problems are discussed (not solved), present relationships supported (or perhaps even strained). In popular American terms: "here's the topic, it's problematic, we need to talk." On some occasions, this is a ritualized way of being American together.

Hearing Donahue as one engaged in this culturally expressive practice, then, leads us to hear that one might discuss this topic (i.e., coitus) in public, that it might be called "sex," that it might be symbolically constituted as a physical, technical, individual activity, that facts about it might be discussed rationally and seriously, that it is discussed and discussable as problematic. All of this is at least intelligible (if not entirely acceptable) to an American audience. The cultural game Donahue plays implicates a belief about "problem" talk: It is a potent social activity, an efficacious remedy for important social problems (which motivates a communally sensed urgency to the whole performance, yet once again).

The presupposed sequence—topic initiation, problematizing, response cycle—as a general cultural form, invokes four common ground rules for speaking, with each containing culturally loaded symbols (in quotes): (1) In some American

conversations, the presentation of "self" is a preferred communication activity, with statements of personal experiences, thoughts and feelings counting as proper "self" presentations; (2) interlocutors must grant speakers the moral "right" to present "self" through personal statements; (3) the presentation of "self" should be "respected," that is, tolerated as a rightful expression; (4) corporate and global (i.e., collective) standards are dispreferred because they unduly constrain "self," infringe upon "rights," and violate a code of personal "respect." These rules enable a public sense of free expression, a sacred grounding of the communal identity, "self," but they also create—necessarily—dissonance on topics and systematic refracting of such things as consensual truths, or collective standards of and for public judgment.²¹

The above "expressive order," the form and rules, implicates and affirms a model of and for being a person: One is "an individual" with a "self." As when one asks about "sex," or who is "responsible for contraceptive use," a belief is displayed about persons such that experiences and feelings are deemed unique, and culpability of agency is located with each. Affirmed in such a system is a powerful equivocal balancing, an affirmation both of the separateness of a person (each person is a unique individual with freedoms and rights) and the common humanity for all (every person is at base an individual). Each and every "individual" can and must make "choices" such as whether to "have sex" or "use a contraceptive." Using these symbols in this way creates a cultural person which has (or should have) "power" and "control" over the (societal/personal) "environment," but also because of this, the "individual" is the locus of responsibility and bears the greatest burden of and articulation in social life.²²

These beliefs about the person are associated with the beliefs about talk and implicate a system of cultural premises:

the person has two main parts,
 the physical (body), and within it,
 the nonmaterial (thought & feeling)
 the nonmaterial cannot be seen
 it is a part of an inner world
 things are not part of that world
 other people can't know what things happen in that part
 saying makes these things known to others
 and is a preferred action

These premises create a cultural notion of person which includes a body and its "mindful" part, the nonmaterial seat of personal being, which becomes the cultural site of discursive action and feeling.²³

Turning back to our utterance, then, by Donahue on line 2, he is asking for a factual disclosure (confession?) about a Soviet male's "individual self" (not the public's collective morality), about his physical experiences on an issue deemed publicly important and problematic. In so asking, he creates a cultural discursive space into which he expects his interlocutor to move. His hope is to create, with his Soviet interlocutors, a ritualized—albeit American—public discussion. So designed, it is presumed that each person—"self"—can (and should) rationally discuss his or her own experiences, thoughts, and feelings, displaying a serious rationality about "sex," thereby helping to remedy the difficult exigence, the presumed "problems"

with the Soviet person and "society." These meanings, or something like them, must be hearable for his speech to make sense. With them, we hear a culture at work, upon an intercultural occasion.

A Soviet Reply

Immediately upon hearing Donahue's first question, the Soviet audience is aroused. Eyebrows are raised, laughter ensues, torsoes wave back and forth with startled glances exchanged. At one level, and following the corrective action taken by the Soviet woman on lines 38-40, we might explain much by positing the Soviet rule: In public discussions, especially with outsiders, it is not preferable (even though possible) to discuss sexual matters. It is this proscription, evidently, that Donahue violates with his line of questioning (1-2, 4, 6-7, 11-12), thus precipitating the above reactions. The rule also accounts for some of the expressed embarrassment and reserve by the two Soviet women who spoke. As Donahue notes in his talk-over (line 44), "they were reluctant to discuss." For an American ear, we hear something fishy going on, more evidence for a "closed society," people unable, perhaps even constrained by the state, to speak their mind. But as stated, we have a negative, a general moral proscription, a how not to speak. What, then, is affirmed? What communication, from the standpoint of the Soviet expressive order, should be forthcoming? And what does it instantiate that is cultural? What does it say about persons, social relations, talk, and feeling?

At this point the justifications offered by the Soviet males on lines 46-59 help orient our interpretation. Note the utterances take on an agonistic form, a contrasting of your ways with ours. A comment made consistently and recurrently throughout the dialogues appears on lines 46-47: you Americans "can't understand us." While several reasons are given elsewhere by the Soviets for this (e.g., a biased and uninformed American media, poor education on Soviet culture and history), the ones expressing the difference here are, you "have many more problems than we have, the criminality, drugs, etc." and Americans are accustomed to "being on television" and talking a certain way, but we (the Soviets) are not. What is amplified and applauded, to the delight of the audience, is this: "What can we do if everything is all right here? Should we create problems? We don't want to invent problems. Why?"

These Soviets have heard Donahue plodding down a problem-strewn path which to them is incoherent—thus laughable—in this public context. "Should we create problems" just so we have something to talk with you about? There are at least two premises supporting the Soviet's question. First, we do not have these problems of premarital sex, drugs, and criminality. They are not parts of our lives. Indeed, during some interviewing this position was asserted as an actual truth. Such things are said not to be part of some Soviet lives: "We don't hear about these things in our press, and we don't live with these kinds of people [drug users, criminals]. Sure, it might exist somewhere, but it's not part of my life, in my community." Given this as an uncontested discursive fact, then indeed "problems" such as these—at least for the immediate interactional moment—are ruled out of social existence.

Juxtaposing this Soviet social fact with the American premise of "problems" precipitates replies by Americans of disbelief and skepticism. Thus, Donahue's talk-over mentions a "reluctance to discuss" (44), "reluctance" implying that "they"

are holding back the truth, rather than stating it. Again, "reluctance" here becomes an American code word which simply re-asserts the Americanized "problem" focus and preferences for publicly personal self-talk about facts, translating the matter again into American terms and premises.

A second premise for the Soviet line, "everything is all right here . . . we don't want to invent problems" (54, 56), orients less to facts and truth than to a proper stance for public conduct. The stance introduces the affirmative side of a Soviet rule system, a norm for proper comportment: In public discussion, especially with outsiders, it is preferable to speak a unified, corporate voice with statements of morals and shared virtues counting as unifying. Given this rule, it becomes easier to hear how the first 37 lines of the segment are highly unusual for the Soviets. Why would anyone come here and start talking first of all about private matters like "sex," and further, if that topic, about *problems* like premarital pregnancies?²⁴ The Soviet form for proper discussion, then, follows not an American sequence of topic initiation, problem statement, and response, but another in which a public topic, when socially ratified, is predicated to a collective agent through common virtues. Looking back to our segment from the standpoint of this Soviet form we can now hear, from the first speaker (3, 5, 8-10, 13) to the second (15-23), how discussion moved from the less virtuous, personalized, and factual, "I started [sex at 18]," to the more virtuous, collectivized, and moral "most/they/the majority were virgins before marriage." We also have an account for how the second Soviet female speaker (28-37) (called "courageous" by one Soviet informant, a "Bimbo" by another) dared reveal an individualized (Westernized?) moral, "[before marrying him] a woman should be quite sure of what her husband is as a man." In so doing, she contributed to a sense of violation of the above Soviet rule since her statement was an individual opinion about a moral issue rather than a collective belief about shared virtues. This intensified the mounting sense of imperfection and urgency (i.e., more personal and public talk about sex), which immediately precipitated the corrective action on the next lines 38-40.

Soviet dimensions of meaning ground the above rules and form, and need to be highlighted. Note the rules require a clear division between public and private life, and distinguish the kind of talk proper in private among "insiders" from that which is proper in public for the sake of "outsiders," especially for "outsiders" who are sensed to be "officials of the [Soviet and American] state," as Donahue was keenly sensed to be.²⁵ This became quite pronounced when Donahue tried to interview Refuseniks, who would not talk with Donahue because of his sensed "cavorting" (*blat* or connection) with the "state." Donahue, being the free-standing individual he sensed himself to be, kept expressing utter bewilderment: "You appear to be upset with me, and I don't understand why." His reply, to "being a puppet in the state's hands," was "I'm controlling this!"²⁶ For our purposes, we simply use the moment to demonstrate how the Soviet conversation, when deemed *public* or for *outsiders*, expresses a virtuous, connected collective. When matters turn *private*, for *insiders*, more individualized themes can prevail.

Listening with these Soviet rules, form, and dimensions, one begins to hear in this talk a Soviet sense, and with it to discover the various interactional sources of Donahue's breach. Here he brings to a public, collective forum, where shared virtues guide discussion, a private matter which he explores through personal,

individual, and scientific or factual terms. The exigence he creates, or the "precipitating event" as Goffman called it, includes a configuration of at least these features: An improper topic (sex rather than the common morality of public life) is brought to a setting and discussed in an improper way (scientifically rational, technical, and individual rather than moral, passionate, and corporate) through an improper form (foregrounding societal problems rather than shared virtues). That Soviets should act according to their own cultural forms and norms was made even more apparent to me during a meeting with a Soviet student in my office. Discussing the public-private distinction in Soviet life, and seeing pictures of my children and wife rather hidden behind books and papers, I was asked: "Why make your family pictures available? You devalue your family and experiences and memories by doing this." And further, with regard to the topic of "sex" and related matters: "We don't discuss our personal experiences whatever they are [in public], love, sex, relations with God. We cannot express these in words. You make it shallow if you speak it in public." As one underground artist put it: "The most interesting things are going on in private where you can't see them." Here, then, we hear elaborated another feature: Public expression counts as collective sayings which, relative to the individual/private, are shallow.²⁷ Private expression involves more intensely passionate sayings which are, as the woman in lines 39-40 put it, "very deep to be concerned by us." Public discourse is conceived by Soviets, then, as a display of proper relations for outsiders or distant others, as relatively shallow and marked by taciturnity, whereas private discourse among insiders runs deeper and involves greater volubility. Soviet beliefs about public talk, then, orient to shared moral bases of life, and distinguish a kind of *reserve* in *public* with *outsiders*, from a greater *expressiveness* in *private* among *insiders*.

Our interpretation here can be extended by recourse to a central Russian cultural symbol, "dusa" (roughly, soul), which the Soviet woman's phrase, "very deep," and the above dimensions culturally invoke. The beliefs about the person associated with this cultural symbol and elaborated with this expressive system create, like the American system, a *persona* of two parts, but the deeply felt, focal symbolic site of being differs:²⁸

the person has two main parts
 the body and the soul
 one cannot see but one can feel the soul
 because of the soul, things can happen in and among persons
 that cannot happen in anything other than persons
 these things can be good or bad
 because of this part, a person can feel things
 that nothing other than a person can feel

This symbolically constructed notion of the Soviet person entitles a dynamic integrative world which is "above all, emotional" and morally colored, *and* which holds strong transcendental overtones.²⁹ "Dusa" symbolizes a model person, then, not just as a distinct physical body with a rational and mindful self within, but further contrasts this organismic entity with a kind of cosmological connectedness, with a transcendent moral (good or bad), deeply feeling, and distinctly inter-human realm. The desired locus of discourse, when forthcoming in public or in private, is not so much a rational, scientifically technical, individual utility as it is a passionate, morally

connected, shared feeling.³⁰ As Pasternak put it in *Doctor Zhivago*, "You in others, that's what your soul [dusa] is."³¹ Preferred Soviet sayings usher forth, at least generally and characteristically, as soul-felt and relational expressions more than individually mindful and factual disclosures.

The Soviet form for public discussion, conversational rules, and premises of personhood thus place us in a better position to hear this intercultural segment, especially the topic of "sex." Note that "sex" entitles an activity as much animal as it is human. As such, it violates the Russian sense of "soul," for the soulful person involves things that can happen in and only in a person. As one informant put it: "Sex is something animals do." Further, it is being discussed in a factual, rational, scientific way, with regard to contraceptive techniques and "practices," in public terms of "animalistic mechanics," rather than in a proper moral tone of deep feeling which weds it with uniquely human sensual passion. It is easier to see how a Soviet female, upon viewing the segment, discussed how the first male speaker was *put in the position* of being a "fool and jerk," for he was swept into more rational/factual disclosures of individual, personally problematic, and animalistic experiences with "sex." The proper tone, form, and meanings, matters of the soul, virtuous positions, and unified themes were being wholly supplanted and elided.

SOUL IN, SELF AS CULTURAL CONVERSATION

Russian conversation, as Russian life generally, is erected on three fundamental cultural dimensions. The primary one is the keenly sensed difference between public/private contexts, with two respective others, shallow/deep and taciturn/voluble. With these axes, discourse becomes public when outsiders or an outside influence is deemed present, precipitating rather taciturn sayings of relatively shallow, if collective, virtues. Created in the process is the rather famous Soviet public "front," the requisite "official Russia," Pravda's Russia, a conversational *pokazukha* or show.³² Private contexts, on the other hand, are created primarily with insiders (e.g., kin and like ethnicity), framing speech as possibly going much deeper, as a context into which the passionate and sentimental dimension of lives are given a voice through what is called a "broad spirited" (*shirokaya dusha*), heart-to-heart or soul-to-soul (*po dusham*) kind of exchange.³³ The intensity, frequency, and durability of this relatively deep privatized expressiveness led one student of Soviet culture to write of a "nation of incurable romantics," but also to contrast this with the cold, stuffy, pompous persona performed in public.³⁴ Conversational and cultural life in the Soviet Union apparently revolves around such axes, contrasting a publicly shallow and taciturn discourse with another more private, deep and voluble.

This cultural framing of talk-in-action reflexively constructs a dual quality in the Russian person. As a prominent observer of Soviet life, Hedrick Smith, put it:

From childhood onward, Russians acquire an acute sense of place and propriety. . . . They divide their existence into their public lives and their private lives, and distinguish between "official" relationships and personal relationships. . . . They adopt two very different codes of behavior for their two lives—in one, they are taciturn, hypocritical, careful, cagey, passive; in the other, they are voluble, honest, direct, open, passionate. In one, thoughts and feelings are held in check. . . . In the other, emotions flow warmly, without moderation.³⁵

The "soul" (*dusa*) of the Russian person, as a passionate, morally committed,

distinctly human agent, and as the shared locus of communal symbolic life, is presupposed for each discursive performance, but is more happily and intensely elaborated in private. Given these beliefs about conversation and the person, one can hear in such conversation its prominent symbolic motive and meanings: expressing the soul of person, human passion and morality, the good and the bad, in its dually distinctive, ritually performed, public and private ways.

American conversation, at least that part of it initiated by Donahue in this segment, is prominently motivated on the basis of the rule: Express your "self" honestly, with private experiences and personal opinions becoming easily elaborated as the context for public discussion. "Self" as something uniquely within, as something communally valued, and as something implicating the dignity both of that individual and implicitly of the person so conceived, becomes a public symbolic scene. Who is this particular person? What does one, as such, have to say, to contribute? Informing others of one's own experiences, thoughts, and feelings, one's true and authentic self, the personal facts of the matter, becomes a prominent motive and context for public discursive action.

The above interpretations offer several initial substantive findings with regard to Soviet and American patterns of cultural communication, with each distinctive in its ritualized form. We find, on the one hand, a soulful collective conversing on the basis of morality, orienting to the possible virtues in their societal life. On the other hand we find mindful individuals conversing on the basis of factual information, disclosing their real personal experiences in response to societal problems and issues. The former might sense the latter, at times as soulless (lacking morality, commitment and loyalty to the common good), just as the latter might sense the former as mindless (lacking factual information and analytic abilities). These statements are of course generalities, characterizations of two distinctive discursive styles, and are offered tentatively with their individual applications and interactional negotiations detailed above.³⁶

But what exactly is the culture of the discourse?³⁷ With regard to this Soviet communication, the illustrative data suggest the following features: (1) normative rules for public discourse including a proscription (i.e., one may, but should not, discuss sex in public) and a prescription (i.e., one should orient discursively to shared moral bases of life), which operate within a general cultural form (i.e., initiate topic, state collective moral positions); (2) communal premises creatively invoked to ground claims about Soviet life (i.e., we don't have problems like Americans); (3) shared dimensions of meaning which elaborate the cultural meanings-in-use and thus frame and motivate the cultural discourse (i.e., distinguishing degrees of public/private contexts, outsider/insider participants, influences, or relations, shallow/deep themes or topics, taciturn/voluble levels of expressiveness); (4) more specifically, the symbolic structuring of intimate topics (e.g., coitus) as a private, "very deep," distinctly human matter, as something to discuss in the proper relational context, where the proper depth of feeling and expressiveness can be displayed, which makes intimacies a feature within a moral domain or virtuous style of life (e.g., "sexual life" or "love life") rather than isolated acts to be publicly, mechanically, and factually analyzed (e.g., "have sex"); (5) most generally, the rules, form, premises, dimensions, and symbolic structuring configuring to create a ritual of public discourse, motivated by a moral breach (the outsider who seeks intimate

facts in public), redressed through the creative invocation of the above means (through laughter, embarrassment, a rule statement, justifications), which re-establishes a Soviet expressive order, its meanings about talk (a kind of epideictic expression of common virtues) and about the person (the moral, passionate, and corporate locus of conversational life), that is, expressing "soul."³⁸

The analogous claims about American communication suggest the following: (1) the symbolic structuring of the topic of "sex," through a cluster of terms including "contraceptive use," "pregnancy," "responsibility," which invokes semantic domains of physiological facts, techniques of practice, and individual responsibility; (2) serious discussion of coitus in an analytical, mechanical, rational tone; (3) the symbolic sequence, from "sex" to "pregnancy," as instantiating a cultural form of topic initiation, statement of societal problem, response; (4) the normative rule system preferring speech about personal experiences and opinions, respecting others who so speak, tolerating a range of views, and restraining collective moral statements; with (5) most generally, the symbolic structuring, domains, tone, form, and rules configuring to create a ritual of public discourse which is motivated by an exigence (i.e., problems with society) and redressed through particular means (i.e., rules for public discourse on a problematic topic) which highlights an American expressive order. The attendant meanings about talk, an open and public confession about lives, and the person, the uniqueness of the individual, become the locus of conversational life, that is, disclosing "self."

Beyond these substantive findings I hope the essay demonstrates how communication theory can be developed ethnographically and what such theory suggests for the study of cultures in conversation. For example, we began by viewing an intercultural segment through Goffman's model of ritual interchange and Bitzer's model of the rhetorical situation. Goffman's interactional form of corrective processes motivated our initial "noticing."³⁹ By calling to attention moments of face-work, presentation and repair, it brought to the fore interactional dynamics dense with meaning and productive for (inter)cultural analysis. The segment interpreted here, in turn, suggests some refinement in the theory of this interactional process. Goffman presents the process in one implicit (the precipitating) and four explicit (challenge, offering, acceptance, thanks) phases. Some slight modifications following Victor Turner and creating perhaps a "drama of rituals" framework were required for the present analysis.⁴⁰ A first phase of a *breach*, or exigence, was made explicit. And, further, differing cultural premises for what indeed constituted a breach were identified, leading the symbolic site of discourse in two different directions, one toward societal problems, the other toward immediately untoward actions. A second phase, called *crisis*, was useful in noticing how each breach was recognized and treated and in identifying the ways participants informally publicized that fact through, on the one hand, an alleged "reluctance to talk" and, on the other, repeated laughter and looks of astonishment. A third phase of *challenge* was used by the Soviets to acknowledge directly the untoward conduct, this being followed by a phase of *corrective actions*, in this case done both by the Soviets in the form of rule statements and justifications and by Donahue who finally promised to change the topic. Donahue's promise led to a direct *acceptance* by the Soviets which re-established the Soviet expressive order, the terms, forms, rules and persona necessary for their subsequent discussion. The final phase, in its full-blown version, is not shown in this segment nor explicitly done in this case, but would involve a

thanks by the offender for indulging his or her infelicities. We note also that the Soviet ritual form, the one fully performed here, is not enacted linearly but in this case cycles through two phases of breach (mostly by Donahue but also by the second female Soviet speaker who dared express a unique moral position) before being efficaciously corrected. These modifications to the general framework of ritual interchange are indeed slight, and in keeping with the general spirit of the theory, but do seem to help clarify phases and functions of the ritual process, and the necessity of understanding the cultural resources through which each works.

A further clarification in the framework for interpreting this "drama of rituals" is suggested by considering Philipsen's definition of ritual.⁴¹ While Goffman and Turner identify generic sequential phases as ritualized and dramatic, respectively, and Bitzer draws our attention to the communally sensed "imperfection" which motivates them, Philipsen notes how the actions of each phase are symbolic acts, meaningful in distinctive and particular ways, with each such way, when correctly performed in conversation, celebrating a sacred object, god term, or epitomizing cultural symbol. In the conversational segment grounding this report, the key "sacred objects" are "soul" and "self." Summarizing cultural systems of communication through single sacred symbols as these runs a risk, suggesting in sum an entity, a reified "thing," or unitary "symbol." Interpreting speech this way risks sounding as if the central or core symbol stands alone, somehow above or apart from a symbolic, ideational or ideological, system. But can one sever a part from the whole? I think not. Instead, one begins hearing distinctive cultural systems at work in singular moments of conversation. One travels through the local discursive terrain to know each verbal ecosystem and the species of symbol which sets it apart. So, in the above we come to see, and hear, in the ritualized sequences, cultural systems being asserted and re-asserted, and symbolic meanings being acted, with the eventual outcome being the replacement of an American "self" with the Russian "soul," a symbolic shift from the unique and honest one to the collectively compassionate, moral locus of all. But the cultural force of this symbolic transformation can only be fully displayed (if such is possible) by tracing the relevant radiants of meaning throughout each expressive system. In so doing, we find the ritualized drama motivated by such things as cultural dimensions (private/public, shallow/deep, taciturn/voluble), cultural forms for expression (proper topic, moral comment) and conversational rules (dispreferring bestial topics and preferring public displays of a moral voice), that is, the interactional coding of a cultural identity (an emotional, morally colored, and transcendent person). In this sense, the ritualized renewal of the Soviet expressive order re-institutes a core and sacred symbol, as it also supplants an American one, but does so metonymically, making a change of topic, a shift in the cultural grounds of discussion. And thus cultures come to life in conversation, sometimes in distinctively ritualized forms, such that within this single conversation one seeks facts while another speaks morality. To know how this is so, we must hear in conversation not only generic rituals, but with them systems of cultural meanings.

NOTES

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November, 1990; at a conference sponsored by the State University of New York, Albany, February, 1990; and at colloquia at the Department of Communication, Arizona State University, December, 1989 and April, 1990. The author would like to thank Nelson Traquina, Rom Harre, Robert Sanders, and Charles Bantz, among others, for opportunities to discuss these ideas.

¹The term, conversation, is being used here to refer to meaningful social interaction, with culture referring both to the meaning systems participants presuppose as a condition for social interaction and to the particular resources, forms, codes, or discourses used in social interactions. To claim there are cultures in conversation is to draw attention to the distinctive conditions and resources which are creatively invoked in social interaction. For a discussion of conversation as culturally coded discourses of persons, actions, and feelings see Donal Carbaugh, *Talking American* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1988), and "Toward a Perspective on Cultural Communication and Intercultural Contact," *Semiotica* 80 (1990): 15-35. The general approach suggests hearing "conversation" as a process in which cultural codes are realized and negotiated. See Gerry Philipsen, "The Prospect for Cultural Communication," *Communication Theory: Eastern and Western Perspectives*, ed. D. Lawrence Kincaid (New York: Academic Press, 1987) 245-254.

²Throughout the essay, I use the term "Soviet" because that was the main term used by my informants and because the patterns I report were produced by speakers from various ethnic groups within the now dismantled "Soviet Union." The term is of course not without its difficulties. I switch to the term "Russian" when the analysis suggests a distinctly Russian feature. Following standard usage, "American" refers to patterns prominent and distinctive within the United States.

³The ethnographic approach derives from Dell Hymes, "Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Life," *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication*, ed. John Gumperz and Dell Hymes (New York, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972) 35-71; with recent formulations in Philipsen, "Prospect," and Gerry Philipsen, "An Ethnographic Approach to Communication Studies," *Rethinking Communication: V. 2, Paradigm Exemplars*, ed. Brenda Dervin, Lawrence Grossberg, Barbara J. O'Keefe, and Ellen Wartella (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1989) 258-268. Discussion of the approach with special attention to intercultural communication appears in Carbaugh, "Toward a Perspective," and Donal Carbaugh, "Intercultural Communication," *Cultural Communication and Intercultural Contact*, ed. Donal Carbaugh (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1990) 151-175.

⁴See for example Richard Bauman, "Aspects of 17th Century Quaker Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 56 (1970): 67-74; Gerry Philipsen, *Speaking Culturally* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, in press); Kristine Fitch, "The Interplay of Linguistic Universals and Cultural Knowledge in Personal Address: Colombian *Madre* Terms," *Communication Monographs* 58 (1991): 254-272; Jack L. Daniel and Geneva Smitherman, "How I Got Over: Communication Dynamics in the Black Community," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 62 (1976): 26-39; Tamar Katriel and Aliza Shenhar, "Tower and Stockade: Dialogic Narration in Israeli Settlement Ethos," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 76 (1990): 359-380.

⁵Yousuf Griefat and Tamar Katriel, "Life Demands *Musayra*: Communication and Culture among Arabs in Israel," *International and Intercultural Communication Annual* 13 (1989): 121-138; Ronald Scollon and Suzanne Scollon, *Narrative, Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1981).

⁶See William Gudykunst and Stella Ting-Toomey, *Culture and Interpersonal Communication* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988) 231; Wendy Leeds-Hurwitz, "Culture and Communication: A Review Essay," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 76 (1990): 85-116. Some studies which have introduced cultural interpretations of intercultural encounters are reviewed and compiled elsewhere (Carbaugh, "Toward a Perspective"; see unit two in Donal Carbaugh, ed., *Cultural Communication and Intercultural Contact*). The special sense of cultural interpretation being used here is developed in Donal Carbaugh, "Communication and Cultural Interpretation," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 77 (1991): 336-342.

⁷For uses of exemplars or instances in communication studies see Robert Hopper, "Speech, For Instance: The Exemplar in Studies of Conversation," *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 7 (1988): 137-153; Scott Jacobs, "Evidence and Inference in Conversation Analysis," *Communication Yearbook* 11, ed. James Anderson (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988) 433-443.

⁸The following transcript was very difficult to create because it consists of spoken English and spoken Russian with English translations of the spoken Russian often running simultaneously over the spoken Russian. The system used to create the transcript attempts to deal with this complex dynamic as follows: each line of text was numbered, with the numbered lines appearing in three tiers marked, a, b, and c. The text spoken in English appears as line (a). When line (a) is an untranslated utterance in English, it is unmarked (e.g., 2a:). When a line is an English translation of a Russian utterance, provided by an on-air network translator, it is marked (e.g., 5a: [trans.]). The (b) tier of a line provides, whenever possible, a second English translation of the Russian utterances by a native speaker of Russian. This provides readers with a kind of crosscheck between the translation provided by a television network and that provided by a relatively independent, Russian speaking viewer. This translation (provided on line b) was of course not broadcast. Tier (c) provides, as far as was possible, a transcription of the Russian utterances which were spoken on this occasion. This was very difficult to retrieve since the spoken Russian was often inaudible due to the simultaneous on-air English translation. Given the approach adopted here, focusing as it does on spoken cultural symbols, the lines are arranged according to symbolic and semantic content, with each set of three tiers aligning the analogous linguistic items or cultural categories. By organizing

the transcript this way, attention is thus drawn to culturally coded symbols and meanings more than to the exact sequencing of real time overlaps between, for example, the on-air translations and the original spoken Russian, which is, rather than naturally occurring, an artifact of the television broadcast. Unintelligible speech is marked with (. . . .); probable but not certain translations occur in parentheses, (hanging out); noticeable pauses are marked with (.); speech that is done rapidly is marked between the # sign; with some notable nonverbal responses marked in brackets [applause].

⁹So conceived, the ritual interchange falls within a class of communication practices treated theoretically as "aligning actions," practices which interactionally invoke culture in conduct. See Randall Stokes and John Hewitt, "Aligning Actions," *American Sociological Review* 41 (1976): 838-849. For a related discussion of rules and phases of alignment episodes see Brad Hall, "An Elaboration of the Structural Possibilities for Engaging in Alignment Episodes," *Communication Monographs* 58 (1991): 79-100.

¹⁰See Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior* (New York, New York: Pantheon Books, 1967) 19.

¹¹Goffman, *Interaction Ritual* 5-45. Exigence is being used here in its rhetorical sense. See Loyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 1-14.

¹²The ethnographic interpretations of this segment are based upon analyses of a larger corpus: the *Donahue in Russia* series both in transcript and audio-visual form; co-observations of this series between myself and Russian co-investigators (we taped ourselves observing and reading these materials, and used these tapes, among other things, as data, watching ourselves watch, so to speak); semi-structured interviews with Americans who have interacted regularly with Soviets, and Soviets who have interacted regularly with Americans; observations of additional American and Soviet interactions, other than those televised; and, of course, readings of literature on Soviet, and American, everyday life. The interpretations of the Soviet communication system were produced in collaboration with Vicki Rubinshteyn, Diane Chornenkaya, Lazlo Dienes, Olga Beloded, Joseph Lake, among others.

¹³Bitzer 10.

¹⁴As Donahue might know, part of the unspoken consensus in urban Soviet common culture is that many women have multiple abortions, with numbers in the twenties and thirties being not uncommon. See Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York: Ballantine, 1976) 187-191.

¹⁵Bitzer 11.

¹⁶Bitzer 2.

¹⁷See Tamar Katriel and Gerry Philipsen, "'What We Need is Communication': 'Communication' as a Cultural Category in Some American Speech," *Communication Monographs* 48 (1981): 301-317; Carbaugh, *Talking American* 153-176.

¹⁸See Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 365-366.

¹⁹A similar introduction to the topic of "sex" was made by an American medical doctor on a college campus who was conducting a "workshop on sex education and birth control." He began with, "Tonight we're going to talk about sex. We're here to talk about sexual things, not moral issues. Whether it's right or wrong, good or bad, you'll have to decide for yourself. We're just going to talk about sex." Reported in "Condoms, Spermicides? Dr. Abel Doesn't Blush," *Collegian* 13 May 1991: 3.

²⁰Carbaugh, *Talking American* 127-166.

²¹Derived from Donal Carbaugh, "Communication Rules in DONAHUE Discourse," *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 21 (1987): 31-62.

²²Carbaugh, *Talking American* 21-86; see also Donal Carbaugh, "Deep Agony: 'Self' vs. 'Society' in DONAHUE Discourse," *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 22 (1988/1989): 179-212.

²³Adapted from Anna Wierzbicka, "Soul and Mind: Linguistic Evidence for Ethnopsychology and Cultural History," *American Anthropologist* 91 (1989): 41-58. See also Rom Harre, *Personal Being* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

²⁴Extremely important to note is that the Soviets in this segment never use the term "sex" alone (with only one possible exception). Their discussion of the topic occurs in a rather veiled style. The four veiled references to the topic are as "it" (8), "that" (16), "that" (37), and "the subject" (38). At two points, the Soviet translators supply differing terms. At 34 the network translator (34a) supplies "sex," while the independent translator (34b) supplies "it"; at 35 the network translator (35a) supplies "sex" while the independent shows no translation of the term. Similarly, the veiled predications about the topic (e.g., coitus) are: "I started [sex at age 18]" (3); "I was well prepared [for sex]" (10); "sure of what her husband is as a man, that he'll be a real partner" (31a-32a) or "be sure of her husband as a man" [adequate at sex] (31b-32b). One difference between translators occurs with regard to the relevant predications: "the first woman with whom they had ever had sexual relations" (22a) or "their wife was their first girl (.) woman that they liked" (22b-23b). Reference to the topic is thus relatively veiled, oblique, or indirect (e.g., "it" or "that"), as are predications about the topic (e.g., "be a real partner").

²⁵See Smith 6-7, 137-140.

²⁶See Smith 18 for the cultural (more than the political) roots which highlight the connected agent over "the individual." As one informant put it: "In the Russian culture it is common to address [and hear] issues of life from a global and moral perspective. Personal beliefs about social practices are presented as exercised patterns of behavior. They might be heard as more or less typical, but they are usually predicated to a collective agent."

The speaker's views are supposed to be shared by a collective beneficiary." The importance of designing speech with a collective and connected voice is evident also in a common Soviet proverb told to schoolchildren: "I is the last letter in the alphabet," which means according to one informant, "put yourself after the others on your list of priorities." The same cultural principle creates the Soviet form of postal address, beginning at the *top* with the country of the addressee, under which comes their city name, then their street name, with the individual's name at the *bottom*, last name first.

²⁷See Smith 21.

²⁸The following formulation is adapted from Wierzbicka.

²⁹Wierzbicka 52.

³⁰Realizing this helped me understand what was heretofore a puzzling situation. A Soviet student called me at home one evening and asked, with no explanation, the date of my birth. Later, I realized the student was making decisions about advisory committees and wanted to know my astrological sign as a way of interpreting the nature of our connection within a transcendently connective, feeling-full domain. The inference I draw from this exchange is not of course that all Soviets are astrologers, or actors on cosmic feeling. What the exchange displays, I think, is a communicative instance of a cultural orientation which itself coheres activities in terms more passionate, transcendently connected, and feeling-full, than does the American, centered as it is in terms of scientific rationality, expressive technicality, and individual utility.

³¹Quotation taken from the Russian version; see Wierzbicka 54.

³²Other analyses based on other data corroborate and extend the claims developed here. See Carbaugh, "Intercultural Communication" 159-160; Donal Carbaugh, "Communication Competence as Cultural Pragmatics: Soviets and Americans in Contact," *International and Intercultural Communication Annual* 17 (in press).

³³The precise ways public/private is interactionally determined is unclear, although "public" is apparently cued not solely on the basis of outside participants (like Donahue), but outside influences generally, including jazz. Hedrick Smith (1976) described how Moscow audiences responded with heightened intensity, great amounts of sobbing and laughing to Russian ballet, but when viewing American ballet, or jazz, were much more restrained and reserved.

³⁴Smith 135-148, ff.

³⁵Smith 139-140.

³⁶I am making general empirical claims about the nature and function of cultural styles of discourse which were used on this occasion. The claims are mute on the ecological distribution and the frequency of use of each style.

³⁷Here I respond to the prod offered by Sally Jackson: "The analyses that make the strongest arguments for structural claims are those offering clearly formulated empirical claims and using examples, if at all, as evidence." See her, "Building a Case for Claims about Discourse Structure," *Contemporary Issues in Language and Discourse Processes*, ed. Donald Ellis and William Donahue (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986) 145.

³⁸The primary data for this report were gathered in 1987-1990, prior to the dismantling of the USSR. What effects these recent political developments may have on the patterns described here is currently unknown. For some informants, the patterns described here are very durable, even in the face of pressures to change. As one informant put it, "We don't know how to do it any other way," with "it" referring to their habitual patterns of expressive life. For the robustness and pervasiveness of traditional Russian styles, see Jane Kramer, "Letter from Europe," *The New Yorker* 12 March 1990: 74, 76-90.

³⁹See Michael Moerman, *Talking Culture: Ethnography and Conversation Analysis* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988) esp. 104-107.

⁴⁰For the social drama frame see Victor Turner, "Social Dramas and Stories about them," *Critical Inquiry* 7 (1980): 141-168.

⁴¹Philipsen, "Prospect."